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Abstract— Bitcoin is gaining increasing popularity nowadays, 
even though the crypto-currencies field has plenty of digital 
currencies that have emerged before the adoption of Bitcoin idea. 
Bitcoin is a decentralized digital currency which relies on set of 
miners to maintain a distributed public ledger and peer-to-peer 
network to broadcast transactions. In this paper, we analyse how 
transaction validation is achieved by the transaction propagation 
round trip and how transaction dissemination throughout the 
network can lead to inconsistencies in the view of the current 
transactions ledger by different nodes. We then measure the 
transaction propagation delay in the real Bitcoin network and 
how it is affected by the number of nodes and network topology. 
This measurement enables a precise validation of any simulation 
model of the Bitcoin network. Large-scale measurements of the 
real Bitcoin network are performed in this paper. This will 
provide an opportunity to parameterise any model of the Bitcoin 
system accurately.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bitcoin is a decentralized peer-to-peer electronic currency 
that allows online payments between two parties without any 
form of central authority [1]. The system was proposed in 2008 
by Satoshi Nakamoto and deployed as a payment system in 
January 2009 [2], [3]. Bitcoin relies on a cryptographic 
protocol that operates on top of the Bitcoin peer-to-peer 
network. The user’s identity in Bitcoin is represented by a 
public key as opposed to their name or other identifiable 
information [4]. Furthermore, Bitcoin is also the name of the 
currency that this network enables where, one Bitcoin (BTC) 
has an equivalent value in British pounds (GBP). 
Bitcoin is considered as a reliable currency which allows 
global transactions to be processed as fast as local ones. In 
addition, it offers a public history of all transactions that have 
ever been processed. It also introduces such new payment 
strategies, such as micropayment, contract, and escrow 
transactions. 
Bitcoin follows a distributed trust mechanism which relies 
on distributed validation and tracking of transactions. Based on 
this mechanism, a Bitcoin transaction has to be broadcasted to 
all nodes within the network to reach a consensus about which 
transactions are valid. The consensus is recorded in a publicly 
distributed ledger which is shared by the entire network. 
As Transactions are validated against the public ledger, 
inconsistency in the replicas of ledger is unavoidable. This 
introduces uncertainty about the validity of a given transaction 
which may lead to an attacker being able to spend a Bitcoin 
twice.  
In this work, we present measurements of the transaction 
propagation delay as well as measurements of the real Bitcoin 
network. These measurements are important to validate and 
parameterise any simulation model of Bitcoin network. We 
further analyse transaction validation in the Bitcoin network 
and how the consistency of the public ledger is affected by 
transaction propagation. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section II focuses on 
giving an overview of the Bitcoin system and briefly 
describing the Bitcoin networking aspects. In Section III, we 
discuss in details the information propagation in the Bitcoin 
network and analyse the double spending attack which is 
caused by the transaction propagation delay. In addition, 
related work in measuring and analysing Bitcoin information 
propagation and in modelling approaches to avoid double 
spending attacks will be outlined. In Section IV, measurements 
of the transaction propagation delay as well as measurements 
of the real Bitcoin network parameters will be presented. In 
Section V, we conclude the paper and discuss the future work. 
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we provide a general overview of the Bitcoin 
system. We focus on the Bitcoin protocol by discussing the 
basic operation of the Bitcoin network and how the globally 
consistent state is achieved. We then give a brief description 
of the relevant aspects of Bitcoin which are block chain and 
the network structure. 
A. The Bitcoin protocol
The Bitcoin protocol is built on the basis of creation and
distribution of public record of all the Bitcoins in the system. 
This record considers each entry as a transaction by which the 
transfer of virtual currency is accomplished. Each transaction 
consists of inputs and outputs. A transaction’s output which 
indicates the new owner of the transferred Bitcoins, will be
referenced as inputs in future transactions to create new 
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output/outputs [5]. Transactions are formed as a directed graph 
which helps when giving constants about transaction record.
  Each transaction input should have a digital signature that 
unlocks the previous transactions’ output. This signature is 
created only by the user who possesses an appropriate private 
key. This ensures that Bitcoins can only be spent by their 
owners. In addition, the sum of the values of the inputs should 
be equal to or greater than the sum of all outputs. 
B. Block Chain 
  Block chain is simply the ledger of all transactions, grouped 
into blocks. Every block is linked with previous blocks by 
including the unique hash of the previous block in its header. 
The first block in the block chain is known as the genesis 
block and it has no references to previous blocks. A branch is 
a path in the block chain which starts from a leaf block to the 
genesis block [6]. Block chain technology is deemed as the 
most important invention in the field of cryptography and 
security of decentralised networks, because it allows an 
immutable record of all transactions to be created, such that it 
is resistant to modification from the most resourceful 
attackers. Block chain is publicly visible and allows nodes 
within the network to agree to be confident about the transfer 
of money between users [7],[8]. Any valid transactions 
disseminated in the Bitcoin network are collected in a block 
by miners. After that, this block requires a degree of 
computational effort before it will be accepted by other nodes 
as valid. A group of nodes known as miners provide this effort 
when they solve the computational problem, and for which 
they are rewarded with a small number of Bitcoins. The 
solution to the problem is easy to verify but difficult to 
calculate and as such the solution can be considered a proof of 
work (POW) [6]. Blocks are chained together, and thus, 
modifying a block becomes exponentially harder with the 
passage of time, as all subsequent blocks must also 
modified[9].  
C . Bitcoin peer-to-peer network 
  In the Bitcoin network, as shown in Fig.1, each peer connects 
randomly with other peers over a TCP channel [10]. Each 
node maintains a list of IPs of peers that the node established 
connections with. For the purpose of making denial of service 
impractical, just the valid transactions and blocks are 
propagated, whereas invalid transactions and blocks are 
discarded. Furthermore, Bitcoin network achieves a reputation 
protocol by which each node maintains a penalty score for 
every connection. Once a node receives a corrupted message 
from a particular connection of its connections, it increases the 
penalty score of the connection and bans the misbehaving IP 
when the score reaches the value of 100. Bitcoin network 
nodes are classified into two groups. Servers which can accept 
incoming connections and those which can’t (clients), because 
Figure 1: The structure of the Bitcoin network 
they are behind NAT or firewall. Peers in the Bitcoin network 
maintains up to 8 outgoing connections and accept up to 117 
incoming connections. Bitcoin peer stays connected to the 8 
outgoing connections until it is restarted, whereas connections 
will be replaced if any of the outgoing connections drop [10]. 
III. INFORMATION PROPAGATION AND RELATED WORKS
   There are two types of information that are propagated in the 
Bitcoin network: Transactions and Blocks. Transactions are 
responsible for transferring values, whereas blocks are used to 
ensure a chronological ordering of transactions across all 
nodes in the Bitcoin network and also form part of the ledger 
[11]. To broadcast a transaction, a user simply connects to a 
number of peers within the network and sends it to them. Each 
peer maintains history of forwarded transactions for each 
connection and if it has not seen that transaction before then it 
will rebroadcast it to all of its peers [12]. In the following, we 
discuss how the Bitcoin transaction propagation affects the 
synchronization of the public ledger and the role inconsistency 
of the public ledger plays in making double spending attack 
achievable. Finally, we close this section by highlighting 
related work on measuring, analysing, and speeding up 
Bitcoins transaction propagation. 
A. Transaction propagation  
  Bitcoin uses a gossip-like protocol to broadcast information 
throughout the network [7]. Therefore, transactions are not 
forwarded directly in order to avoid sending a transaction to a 
node that already received it from other nodes. Instead, a node 
announces to its neighbour nodes about the transaction 
availability once the transaction has been verified. As shown
in Fig.2, transactions are disseminated through the network 
using a protocol, which includes propagating two types of 
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When a node receives a transaction from one of its 
neighbours, it sends an INV message containing the hash of 
the transaction to all of its peers. When a node receives an 
INV, it checks whether the hash of a transaction has been seen 
before. If it has not been seen before, the node will request the 
transaction by sending a GETDATA message. In terms of 
receiving a GETDATA message, a node responds by sending 
the transaction’s data. 
   An INV message is not propagated to all of the connected 
peers at the same time, instead, every 100ms it is sent to a 
random selected peer of all connected peers. Therefore, the 
required time for forwarding the INV message relies on the 
number of connected nodes [13]. Due to the above 
broadcasting scenario, a delay in transaction propagation 
happens, and this delay combines between time which takes to 
validate the transaction and propagate it. Essentially, 
propagation delay pertains to many issues in the Bitcoin due to 
the inconsistency of the public ledger which comes up with 
the opportunity for an attacker to abuse the network 
consensus. Specifically, inconsistency in the public ledger will 
induce the dishonest nodes to disturb the confirmation 
operation of a valid transaction by broadcasting a conflicting 
transaction with the same amount of coin during the period of 
confirmation, in which the valid transaction waits to be added 
to the block chain. This type of attack is called double 
spending attack in which the attacker attempts to spend the 
same transaction output more than once. 
Double spending attacks happen when an attacker creates 
two transactions (TA and TM) with the same input (same 
source of Bitcoin) and different outputs (different recipients, 
suppose we have two transactions, TA will go to the majority 
of peers and TM will go to the vendor). We can consider the 
double spending attack as successful when TA is confirmed 
before TM. This means the majority of peers accept TA while 
the vendor accepts just TM. This will lead to the acceptability 
of TA by subsequent blocks as an original transaction and the 
vender can not redeem the TM because it is considered as an 
invalid transaction because it is trying to spend money which 
has already been spent [14]. 
Figure 2: Transaction propagation protocol between Nodes A and B
The second scenario of double spending is when an attacker
secretly mines a branch which includes, the transaction that 
returns the payment to himself, while disseminating the
merchant’s transaction [15]. The attacker will not broadcast 
this branch until the merchant’s transaction gets confirmed. In 
this scenario, the merchant is going to be confident about the 
transaction and then he will consider delivering the product. 
Furthermore, the attacker has to be sure that the secret branch 
is longer than the public branch, so if necessary, continue 
extending the secret branch. Finally, an attacker broadcasts the 
secret branch when he confirms that the secret branch is 
longer than the public one. Typically, this is computationally 
expensive, requiring the attacker to control 50% of the 
computing available in the network. 
B. Related works
Most previous analytical studies of the Bitcoin network have 
presented measurements of the network that are linked to the 
information propagation delay. Recent [11] research has 
shown that the number of nodes in the Bitcoin network and the 
structure of overlay network have a great impact on 
transaction propagation time. Their results showed that the 
transaction propagation time is improved by reducing the 
number of nodes from 6000 to 2000. Furthermore, their results 
demonstrated that the overlay topology of the Bitcoin network, 
which is not geographically localised, offers inefficient 
transaction propagation time. Transaction propagation delay in 
real Bitcoin network has been measured in [13],[16] by 
developing a Bitcoin client that tracks how transactions are 
disseminated through the network by listening for INV 
messages.However, previous propagation delay measurements 
do not represent the real propagation delay as it does not 
indicate the exact time by which peers announce transactions.
  The probability of double spending attack in fast payments, 
have been measured in the previous research through 
analytical models, based on measurements in real Bitcoin 
network [12]. In terms of avoiding double spending attack, 
[17] introduced some counter-measures to avoid double
spending attacks and proposed a prototype system, which is
applied in vending machines. The main idea of this system is
to set a server that will observe the transaction. When
transaction propagation reaches over 40 nodes, the server will
give a signal, which means that the transaction has been
confirmed. Unfortunately, this solution is limited because the
attacker’s transaction could still be propagated to the majority
of nodes.
  In [18] a new protocol has been proposed which tackles the 
problem of inconsistency in the public ledger by reducing the 
information propagation time. This solution claims that the 
information propagation could be pipelined instead of waiting 
to receive the transaction. In other words, any node can 
immediately forward an invitation message (INV Message) 
that includes a list of hashes of available transactions, rather 
than waiting for receiving transactions. Another change has 
been proposed in the same theory. This change increases the 
geographical connectivity in Bitcoin network in order to offer 
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faster information propagation. However, this theory reduces 
the propagation delay with a very low rate because the 
transaction still needs to visit the all nodes in the Bitcoin 
network. Additionally, the transaction verification time still 
remains inefficient due to the size of the public ledger. 
  A model for faster transaction propagation has been 
presented in [19] by considering some modifications in the 
transaction dissemination protocol. The core idea of this 
model is that when nodes receive a transaction, they check 
whether this transaction has been seen before in their pool. In 
case the transaction has not been seen before, they add the 
transaction to their pool and forward it to the other nodes. 
Otherwise, they directly forward the transaction to other 
neighbours without adding it to their pool. This scenario 
allows the fake transaction to be received by the node that 
issues the original transaction.  
IV. BITCOIN PARAMETERS MEASUREMENT :
 Large scale parameters of real Bitcoin network are difficult 
to predict, therefore, some certainty is required before any 
simulation model of Bitcoin system would be implemented. 
To this purpose, we provide accurate measurements of 
different parameters of the real Bitcoin network. In the 
following subsections, the measurement of transaction 
propagation as well as large scale measurements of real 
Bitcoin network will be presented. Propagation delay is very 
important for the validation of simulation measurements as 
many aspects of the Bitcoin network such as network 
topology, clients’ behaviour, and processing delay affect it. By 
offering these measurments, validation of any Bitcoin 
simulation model would be possible through comparing the 
propagation delay measurements that will be collected from 
the Bitcoin simulator to the same measurements that have 
been collected in this experiment. Also the real Bitcoin 
network measurements are essential to parametrize any model 
of Bitcoin.  
A. TRANSACTION PROPAGATION MEASUREMENT
In this section, we investigate how fast a transaction
propagates in the Bitcoin network and how this is impacted by 
the number of nodes. A transaction propagation delay was 
measured in the prior research by setup a Bitcoin client which 
keeps listening for INV messages. However, we present a 
novel methodology by which the transaction propagation 
delay is accurately measured as the measurements are 
indicated when peers receive transactions. Experiment 
methodology and results are presented in the following 
subsections. 
1) Experiment description and methodology
  To measure the propagation delay, the Bitcoin protocol was 
implemented and used to establish connections to many points 
in the network, in order to measure the time that a transaction 
takes to reach each point. Specifically, we first implemented a 
measuring node, which behaves exactly like a normal node 
with the following functionalities. The measuring node 
connects to 14 reachable peers in the network. Furthermore, it  
Figure 3: Illustration of propagation experimental setup 
is able to create a valid transaction and send it to one peer of 
its connections, and then it tracks the transaction in order to 
record the time by which each peer of its connections 
announces the transaction. To measure how fast a transaction 
is exchanged between the connected nodes, we calculated the 
time by which the transaction is propagated by our measuring 
node and reached each node of our measuring nodes 
connections. Specifically, suppose a client c has connections 
(1,2 ,3,…., n), c propagates a transaction at time Tc , and it is 
received by its connected nodes at different times 
(T1,T2,T3,….,Tn) as illustrated in Fig.3. The time differences 
between the first transaction propagation and subsequent 
receptions of the transaction by connected nodes were 
calculated (???,?,…., ???,?) according to Eq.1: 
???,?= ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
In order to get accurate measurements, the timing 
information was collected by running the experiment 1000 
times as errors such as loss of connection and data corruption, 
are expected to happen in case of dealing with real network. 
At each run, the measuring node is randomly connected to 14 
nodes. The timing information contains the hash of the 
transaction, the announcing nodes IP, transaction confirmation 
time and a local time stamp, which represents propagation 
time once the transaction was received. 
2) Results
  The propagation measurements from this experiment are 
shown in Fig.4. The number of connected nodes represents the 
sequence of the random nodes that the measuring node 
connects with at each run.  Fig 4 indicates that during the first 
13 seconds, transaction has been propagated faster and 6 
nodes received it with low variance of delays. It should be 
noted that the transaction propagation delays is dramatically 
increased over nodes (9,10,14) which means that the 
transaction has been received by these nodes with significantly 
larger variances of delays. Obviously, these results reveal that  
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  Figure 4: Transaction propagation time in real Bitcoin network 
the propagation delay negatively corresponds with the number 
of nodes, as the total duration of subsequent announcements of 
the transaction by the remaining nodes increases with larger 
numbers of connected nodes. This happened due to each node 
being connected to large segments of the network, while the 
connected nodes were not geographically localized. On the 
other hand, transaction verification at each node affects 
trickling transaction to the remaining nodes. However, there 
are possible ways that can improve information propagation in 
the Bitcoin network which in turn would reduce the 
probability of double spending attacks. Reducing the 
noncompulsory hops in that the transaction passes through in 
conjunction with increasing the locality of connectivity are 
considered as a possible scenario that would achieve 
significantly faster information propagation. This can be 
achieved by applying a clustering theory by which the Bitcoin 
network nodes are fully partitioned into clusters depend on its 
geographical location. To evaluate any clustering theory based 
on improving information propagation, major changes are 
required to the Bitcoin protocol which would have to be 
accepted by the Bitcoin community. Therefore, Bitcoin model 
which behaves as close as real Bitcoin network is required. 
Both clustering theory and Bitcoin model are considered as 
our future work. 
  Surprisingly, we noticed that not all of the connected nodes 
received the transaction except rare cases in which all the 14 
connected nodes announced the transaction. Fig.6 shows 
proportions of announcing transactions for each node. Each 
proportion was calculated over 1000 runs. Nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 
are almost announced transactions within proportions between 
90-100. The proportion dramatically declined at node 5 and
continued to go down to reach 23 at node 14. This pointed to
the issue caused by network partitions in which the network is
divided into two or more partitions due to network outages or
link failure, so that no information flow between partitions is
Figure 5: Proportion of each node announced the transaction 
possible. Network partitions are more likely to happen within 
the network topology, which is not geographically localized. 
However, network partitions can be done by an attacker to 
impair main Bitcoin functions. We leave a further analysis of 
this issue as future work. 
B. Bitcoin network measurements
  In this section, we present the measurements of two Bitcoin 
network parameters which are number of the reachable nodes 
and link latencies between peers. These parameters are 
considered as the most influential parameters in the Bitcoin 
network due to their direct impact on the information 
propagation delay in the network. Therefore, these parameters 
are important to parameterise any model of Bitcoin accurately. 
For this purpose, Bitcoin client was implemented and used to 
crawl the entire Bitcoin network through establishing 
connections to all reachable peers in the Bitcoin network. 
Every five minutes the snapshot of IP addresses of all 
reachable peers was published by the developed crawler. We 
discovered that the crawler learned 313676 IP addresses but 
was only able to connect to 5378 peers. This indicates that the 
Bitcoin network size is presently around 5400 nodes. 
   Fig 6 shows the distribution of latencies in the real Bitcoin 
network. The crawler was connected to around 5000 network 
peers and observing a total of 20,000 ping/pong messages. It 
should be noted that the measured distribution only represents 
the latency between our crawler and other peers in the 
network. 
  As these measurements have a direct impact on the 
information propagation time, it is necessitated to perform 
these measurements when any model of Bitcoin is built. 
Though, attaching the measured distribution to the model 
would give an accurate estimate of the time delay that is taken 
by a transaction to reach different peers in the network. 
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Figure 6: Latencies distribution between the measurement node and  
other peers 
V. CONCLUSION 
  A brief background of Bitcoin system and block chain 
technology was presented in this paper. In addition, we 
analysed the information propagation in the real Bitcoin 
network. We have also discussed how propagation delay could 
affect the security by offering an opportunity to double spend 
the same coins, thereby abusing the consistency of the public 
ledger. Furthermore, previous studies to analyse and measure 
the information propagation delay were explained briefly. 
  In order to offer an opportunity to validate and parameterise 
any model of Bitcoin network, different kinds of 
measurements have been presented in this paper. We 
implemented a novel methodology to measure the transaction 
propagation delay in real Bitcoin network. Our measurements 
show that the transaction propagation time is significantly 
affected by the number of the connected nodes and the 
network topology which is not geographically localised. In 
addition, partitions in the connection graph are actively 
detected. Finally, the size of the Bitcoin network and 
distribution of latencies between nodes are accurately 
measured in this paper. 
Future work: 
The future work will be to examine clustering as a mechanism 
to improve the propagation delay. Our proposed approach 
claims that the fully Bitcoin network nodes could be 
partitioned into clusters depend on geographical location. 
Each node will be included in a cluster that correlates to its 
geographical location. We claim that giving rise to the locality 
of connectivity can affect the information dissemination by 
reducing the noncompulsory hops that the transaction passes
through, so that, on other hand, this could minimize the 
propagation delay. 
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